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In September 2005, the Australian government
arrested and deported Scott Parkin, a visiting US
peace activist. This caused a storm of protest and
greatly stimulated community interest in
nonviolent action and threats to civil liberties. The
Parkin case shows how an injustice can backfire
and how activists can use an understanding of
backfire dynamics to be more effective.
Scott[1], a part-time community college instructor
from Houston, Texas, came to Australia in June for
a holiday. An experienced peace activist, he set
aside some time on the trip to meet with local
activists, attend some actions and help run some
workshops.
As co-founder of a grassroots group called Houston
Global Awareness, Scott has been a vocal opponent
of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. He has
also been a prominent critic of the firm
Halliburton, which has massive military contracts
in Iraq and whose former head, Dick Cheney, is
now US Vice-President.
Crucially, Scott is one of a many activists around
the world who promote and use nonviolent
methods such as rallies, vigils, strikes, boycotts,
sit-ins and fasts in order to challenge repression
and oppression. Nonviolent action was
instrumental in toppling repressive regimes such
as in the Philippines in 1986, in Eastern Europe in
1989, in Indonesia in 1998 and in Serbia in 2000
(Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Sharp 1973, 2005).

10/11/2006 11:25 AM

The Parkin backfire

2 of 11

http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/05sa/index.html

Sometimes called 'people power,' nonviolent action
is a tool that those with less formal power can use
against injustice of any sort.
Scott, to his surprise and dismay, was arrested by
Australian Federal Police on 10 September,
detained in jail for five days and then deported.
Why? Government spokespeople wouldn't say
precisely, only that intelligence agencies believed
that Scott represented a 'threat to national
security.'
To lots of people, the government's treatment of
Scott was transparently unjust. Outrage was
apparent, for example, in letters to the editor
(Sydney Morning Herald 2005). Although the
government did not need to use anti-terrorist
powers in order to deport Scott, his treatment
showed the sort of thing that might be in store for
others.
Scott's Australian friends and fellow activists
sprang into action, holding protests in Melbourne,
Sydney, Brisbane, Perth and Cairns. Activists in
Brisbane, for example, marched to the police
building offering to be arrested as threats to
national security. Networks of support were also
activated in the United States, with small protests
taking place in San Francisco and New York.
It is fair to say that Scott's arrest and deportation
backfired against the government. It generated
negative media coverage for the government in
Australia and internationally (Parkin 2005;
SourceWatch 2005), alienated many members of
the public and threw into question the rationale for
new anti-terrorist laws about to be introduced.
Finally, Scott's arrest and deportation gave new
energy to the Australian nonviolence movement,
presumably the very opposite of what this action
was intended to achieve.[2]
The Parkin saga can be usefully understood in
terms of backfire dynamics (Jansen and Martin
2004; Martin 2004; Martin and Gray 2005; Martin
and Wright 2003). The two key conditions for
backfire are a perception of injustice and
communication to receptive audiences.
Perpetrators predictably use various techniques to
inhibit public outrage, which can be conveniently
grouped into five main methods:
* cover-up of the action;
* devaluation of the target;
* reinterpretation of the event;
* use of official channels to give the appearance of
justice;
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* intimidation and bribery.
To increase the chance of backfire, it's valuable to
counter each of these five methods. Accordingly,
we look in turn at struggles in these five areas.

Cover-up and exposure
The first method of inhibiting outrage is to cover
up the action, such as when torture is carried out in
secret.
Scott was arrested in Melbourne on 10 September,
while leaving a cafe, by four plain-clothes police
officers and two immigration officials. Scott had
stopped at the cafe on route to a nonviolence
workshop he planned to co-present; it would
appear that police followed him from the house
where he was staying in order to arrest him while
he was away from people who knew him, thereby
lowering the risk of exposure.
The first person that Scott contacted after he was
arrested was Iain Murray (co-author of this
article), a member of the Melbourne nonviolence
group Pt'chang and coordinator of its Nonviolence
Training Project. Murray went immediately to the
police station where Scott was held and began
contacting others. Civil liberties organisations,
sympathetic lawyers and NGOs such as
Greenpeace were also contacted.
Soon, a small crowd of friends and supporters had
assembled outside the police station, showing that
lots of people were aware of Scott's situation and
upset about his treatment. They also encouraged
people to ring the station asking about his welfare.

Scott's supporters gather outside the Carlton West
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Police Station in Melbourne, shortly after his arrest.
Credit: Rama Cronin
Shortly after his arrest, Scott was transferred to a
high-security prison facility. There, his ability to
communicate with supporters or the media was
curtailed by a ban on phone calls and severe
visiting restrictions.
The next day, some of the protesters issued a
media release about Scott's detention. The media
response was immediate, massive and largely
sympathetic. Cover-up totally failed.

Devaluation and validation
The second method to inhibit outrage from an
attack is to denigrate the targets, for example by
labelling them 'terrorists.'
In response to questioning by journalists,
Attorney-General Philip Ruddock said that it was
the role of ASIO, which had assessed Scott as a
threat to national security, to protect Australians
from political violence. While some media reports
said that Ruddock had accused Scott of 'inciting
political violence,' this wasn't literally correct. In
essence, Ruddock tarred Scott by association.
But suggesting that Scott was linked with political
violence did not succeed, because he was too well
known as a peace activist who was committed to
nonviolence. Devaluation also failed.
Scott's allies always referred to him, in media
interviews, as their friend, and told journalists of
his opposition to violence. They contacted his US
friends and nonviolence trainers he had worked
with during his Australian visit, asking them to
write statements of support. Three of Scott's fellow
trainers travelled to Canberra, the national capital,
to hold an impromptu 'Scott Parkin School of
Peace' in Parliament House at the invitation of
Senator Kerry Nettle.
When Scott was deported, his supporters contacted
the media and assembled at Melbourne Airport
with flowers, balloons and placards reading
'Thanks for your nonviolent work, Scott!' But the
Government foiled this attempt to humanise Scott
by sneaking him onto the plane through a back
route.
A week after Scott was deported, he was smeared
in a front-page story in The Australian under the
title 'Deported activist was to teach tactics of
violence' (Sheridan and Kerin 2005). The article
claimed that Scott 'had been planning to instruct
demonstrators in tactics including disabling police
horses and springing arrested protesters from

10/11/2006 11:25 AM

The Parkin backfire

5 of 11

http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/05sa/index.html

custody.' The authors of the article claimed not to
have been able to contact Scott; they apparently
did not seek comment from his friends in the
nonviolence movement.
Scott immediately issued a media release
countering these claims, explaining that he
opposed any action that might hurt animals and
had spoken out against techniques to de-arrest
protesters. Without credible evidence or backing,
the story appeared to enhance backfire against the
Government as commentators speculated on the
nature of the story's anonymous source.

Interpretation struggles
The third method for inhibiting outrage from
injustice is to reinterpret the action, such as when
civilian casualties are said to be accidents,
exaggerated or someone else's fault.
The government's only attempt at explaining its
actions was to say that ASIO had made an
independent decision on national security grounds,
but for security reasons the actual reason for
ASIO's assessment on Scott could not be revealed.
In other words, the government would not explain
why Scott had been arrested and deported.
Ruddock stated on national radio that in the
previous year ASIO had made nearly 45,000
security assessments of individuals, of which only
three were adverse, 'But the assessments, whether
positive or adverse, are never made known
publicly' (ABC 2005).
In the absence of credible information from the
government, observers could and did easily
interpret the treatment of Scott as a blatant abuse
of power. In the struggle over interpretations, the
government was hardly in the game, and lost
badly.

Official channels
The fourth method commonly used by attackers is
to soothe concern by using official channels, such
as inquiries or courts, that give the appearance of
justice but seldom with much substance. Inquiries
into issues such as Aboriginal deaths in custody
give the appearance of official action, but when the
recommendations languish the main effect is to
diffuse public concern through lengthy procedures.
In Scott's case, official channels were the very
means by which he was attacked. While the
Attorney-General told the media that Scott could
challenge the decision in the courts, officials told
him, falsely, that an appeal would prolong his
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detention. Furthermore, in an appeal, the
government could use its powers to prevent giving
reasons for its actions, for security reasons.
Scott decided to exercise his right to appeal, while
consenting to his removal from Australia. Even so,
he was charged A$11,700 for costs incurred,
including approximately $155 per night for his
detention plus his airfare to the US and airfares for
two agents to accompany him.
The official channels used against Scott had little
credibility in the wider public and did nothing to
stop the backlash against the government. When
Scott arrived in Los Angeles, he was once again
free: US authorities seemed to have none of the
security concerns that had alarmed ASIO. This
inconsistency helped to undermine the Australian
government's action.
After Scott's deportation, it was reported that
ASIO's handling of the Parkin case would be
investigated by the official body that oversees
Australia's intelligence agencies. Because this
review was to be carried out in secret, it had little
potential for giving a greater appearance of justice.

Instead of relying on official channels, Scott's
supporters chose to confront decision makers
publicly and directly, in accordance with Scott's
commitment to nonviolent direct action. Ruddock
found himself facing a room full of supporters
wearing handcuffs and Gandhi masks at a function
in Melbourne, and one of Scott's friends demanded
answers from Prime Minister John Howard on live
talkback radio.
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Both photos: Attorney-General Philip Ruddock was
confronted by Scott's supporters at a speaking
engagement. Credit: Anthony Bruzzese.

Intimidation, bribery and resistance
The fifth and final method to inhibit outrage is
intimidation and bribery. Scott was arrested by six
officers and held in solitary confinement for days
without access to his friends and family. This sort
of treatment certainly can be intimidating. Lawyer
Julian Burnside said that Scott had been told by
immigration officers that if he withdrew his appeal
- to find out why his visa had been revoked - his
deportation date would be sooner. This could be
classified as attempted bribery (Hogan 2005).
Despite the intimidation, Scott made the crucial
decision to contact a trusted friend, who mobilised
other friends and supporters, who in turn alerted
the media and organised further protests. These
allies of Scott were willing to resist, with the result
that intimidation and bribery did not succeed in
limiting outrage.

Conclusion
The government tried all five methods of inhibiting
outrage from its treatment of Scott, but none of
them worked very well. Cover-up failed because
Scott contacted his friend, who then mobilised
others. Attempts to slander Scott had little
credibility because of his commitment to
nonviolence. The government did little to explain
its actions, so that the dominant interpretation was
that they were a blatant attack on civil liberties.
After bad publicity, the government did not use
any formal procedures to give an impression of
fairness. Finally, intimidation and bribery failed,
most importantly because Scott had allies who
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were willing to act, and the media were not afraid
to publish the story.
The result was that Scott's arrest and deportation
backfired on the government. This is most obvious
through the surge of interest and support amongst
the peace movement, the apparent target of the
government's action.
On the email list nonviolencenet, there were
inspiring reports of actions and increased interest.
From Cairns, Queensland, Bryan Law reported
that, 'activist response was extraordinary for our
town. ... People showed up to this action who have
never turned out before for one of our peace
actions.' Louise Cook-Tonkin from Castlemaine,
Victoria, reported that, 'In our small town a group
has come out of the woodwork to begin a street
theatre group on the topic!'
The scale of backfire was also apparent by the
number of letters to the editor, editorials, cartoons
and scathing articles. For example, Paul Gray in a
newspaper article titled 'Fascists taking control'
wrote 'We can all sleep safer in our beds knowing a
notorious peace campaigner, Scott Parkin, has
been deported to America by the Howard
Government. Whew! One less troublesome
puppeteer wearing out our footpaths. ... Is this
really the best John Howard can do to fight
terrorism? The Government says Parkin's
deportation is to protect our national security. In
reality, it's an act of political censorship.' (Gray
2005). The whole affair became an embarrassment
for those who initiated it.
In many ways, the Parkin saga is similar to many
other cases of backfire, but there is an important
difference. Normally, perpetrators find that secrecy
helps to prevent outrage, by aiding in cover-up of
the injustice. In the way it went about arresting
and detaining Scott, the government tried to limit
publicity. But after the story got out, secrecy
actually hindered the government's options for
limiting outrage. Because ASIO's assessment of
Scott was secret, the government could not give a
convincing explanation for its actions: it appeared
only to be covering up. Furthermore, it could not
slander Scott as effectively as it might otherwise
have done. The attack on Scott in The Australian
presumably relied on a leak from ASIO, which in
principle involved a security violation. Official
channels could not easily be used to dampen public
concern because security regulations limited
publicity. Therefore, after Scott's treatment became
known, the government's obsession with secrecy
ironically constrained what it could do to reduce
backfire.
The case illustrates that backfire is much more
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likely when the target of attack is explicitly
committed to nonviolence. Numerous historical
cases show that nonviolent discipline is vital in
causing attacks to rebound against the attacker
(Sharp 1973, 573-655). Scott's commitment to
nonviolence made it clear to nearly all observers
that he was not a terrorist - indeed, his approach
was an alternative to terrorism. This made it far
more difficult for the government to discredit him
and to explain its actions as anything other than
heavy-handed political censorship.
The Parkin case not only demonstrates backfire
dynamics in action, but also represents a practical
application of backfire analysis. Iain Murray, a key
figure in mobilising actions in support of Scott, was
familiar with the backfire framework[3] and used it
- along with his activist instincts and knowledge of
other nonviolence campaigns, such as Otpor! in
Serbia[4] - in choosing and designing actions, such
as efforts to validate Scott and counter attempts to
discredit him.
It is not surprising that backfire analysis can be a
guide for action. Gene Sharp's classification of
methods of nonviolent action and his analysis of
the dynamics of nonviolent action are a form of
grounded theory, namely constructed from
patterns apparent through familiarity with
hundreds of cases of nonviolent struggle. Sharp's
frameworks therefore are quite likely to serve as
good guides for future nonviolent struggles. The
backfire framework, itself an outgrowth of Sharp's
concepts, is also grounded theory, built on
examination of tactics used in a wide range of
cases. In fact, it is through cases such as Scott's
that backfire analysis can be tested, refined and, if
necessary, revised or extended.
One important lesson from the Parkin saga, and
from backfire analysis generally, is that attacks
should not be feared but instead treated as
opportunities. The Australian nonviolence
movement contains quite a number of home-grown
activists with tremendous skills and commitment.
They received a boost from Scott's visit, but
ironically an even greater boost from his exit.
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Endnotes
1 Given our concern about validating the target of
attack, henceforth we usually refer to 'Scott' rather
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than 'Parkin.'
2 The idea of backfire is based on Gene Sharp's
concept of political jiu-jitsu. Sharp says that there
are three groups that can be affected: the grievance
group (in this case the nonviolence movement, civil
liberties groups and others potentially targeted by
the government's anti-terrorism powers), the
attacker group (the government and its agencies)
and third parties (the general public). There is
clear evidence that the treatment of Parkin aroused
concern among the nonviolence movement and the
general public. Whether it caused any concern
within the government and its agencies is unknown
at this stage.
3 Brian Martin gave a workshop on backfire
dynamics in Melbourne in November 2004, which
Iain and other activists attended.
4 Otpor! was a movement in Serbia that led the
nonviolent campaign that in 2000 ended Slobodan
Milosevic's rule, as shown in the film Bringing
Down a Dictator.
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